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ABSTRACT 
This paper surveys the literature on implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium. 
1. Introduction
Implementation theory links together social choice theory and game theory. At a less 
abstract level, its application provides an approach to welfare economics based on individual 
incentives. The underlying motivation for implementation theory is most easily seen from the 
point of view of a relatively uninformed planner who wishes to optimize a social welfare 
function which depends on environmental parameters about which relevent information is scattered 
around in the economy. Thus, the planner wishes to both collect as much of this relevent 
information as possible, and, with this information, make a social decision (e.g., an allocation of 
resources). This is the classic problem identified by Hurwicz [1972]. In the twenty years since, 
we find numerous research agendas falling into the general category of implementation 
problems: the study of planning procedures, contracts, optimal regulation and taxation, agency 
relationships, agendas and committee decision making processes, comparative electoral systems, 
noncooperative foundations of general equilibrium theory, and even much of the recent 
theoretical work in accounting and the economics of law. 
The dilemma such a planner faces is that the individuals from which the information must be 
collected will not necessarily want to share their information, or worse, they may wish to 
misrepresent their information. Moreover, exactly how they choose to conceal and 
misrepresent their information (what we will call their deception decision) depends upon three 
things. First and foremost, it depends on expectations of how the planner intends to put to use the 
information that is being collected. Second, it depends upon their expectations about the 
deception decisions of the other agents. Third, it depends on their information, so it is convenient 
to think of a deception decision as a plan of what to reveal as a function of information. 
The thoughtful pla1111er, realizing this, takes account of the possibility that there may be 
deceptions when deciding how to translate the collected info1mation into a social decision. But 
in order to do this the planner needs to have a basis for predicting how deception decisions 
vary as a function of the individuals' expectations about how he intends to translate the 
information into social decisions. Game theory provides a large family of such predictions, in 
the form of equilibrium concepts, and these each provide a mutually consistent theory of 
individuals' expectations about the deception decisions of the other individuals. In addition to 
a predictive theory of behavior, the planner also needs to consider how he can manipulate the 
individuals' expectations of how he will translate the information into social decisions. The 
latter problem has, at least until very recently, been finessed in implementation theory by the 
commitmentassumption:1. the plam1ermay commit o. any feasible outcome function, which is a
rnle for translating collected information into social decisions. This assumption implies that the 
individuals' expectations exactly coincide with whatever outcome function the plan er has 
announced he will use. Finally, the planner must have the ability to control the infonnation 
collection process. To simplify this problem implementation theory usually imposes the control 
assumption: the planner n1ay choose any message space and the individuals must communicate 
exactly one message from this message space, may not communicate any additional 
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messages, and may not communicate with each other. The combinalion of a message 
space and and outcome function is called a mechanism. 
Given an equilibtium concept and a class of environments, or domain, one can pose the 
incentive compatibility question: For what allocation rules does there exist a mechanism for 
which that allocation rule is an equilibrium outcome? If we can answer that question in the 
affinnative for some allocation rule, that allocation rule is incentive compatible. For many 
equilibrium concepts there is a well-known result called the revelation principle, which states that 
if an allocation is incentive compatible, then it can be produced as the equilibrium outcome Lo a 
particularly simple kind of mechanism, called a direct mechanism. In a direct mechanism the 
message spaces are simply the individuals' info1mation sets and the outcome function is the 
allocation rule itscl f. If an allocation rule is incenlive compatible then it is the "Lruthl'u I" 
equilibrium outcome to its associated direct mechansim. 
However, incentive compatibility is only half of the implementation problem. The other 
half is the multiple equilibrium problem. While an allocation rule may be incentive compatible, 
it may have the problem that any mechanism for which that rule is an equilibrium outcome also 
produces other allocation mles as equilibrium outcomes. An unfortunate implication or the 
multiple equilibrium problem is that the revelation principle may be of only limited usel'ulness. 
In particular, it is concievable (and many plausible examples have been constmcted, see Section 2) 
that under some equilibrium concepts certain incentive compatible allocation rules are unique I y 
implementable, but the direct mechanism associated with that allocation rule is plagued by 
multiple equilibria. This suggests (correctly, as it turns out) that the guts of the mechansirn 
design constructions to uniquely implement incentive compatible allocations are typically quite 
messy - in particular the individuals are asked to report messages that have additional 
components2 beyond simply announcements of their private inf01mation. �evertheless, despite
this additional complexity, it turns out one can prove a simple characterization theorem 
establishing that the multiple equilibrium problem cannot be resolved unless a particular set or 
inequality conditions hold. These inequality conditions are referred to as monotonici ty conditions. 
The problem of designing mechanisms to solve both the incentive compatibility problem and the 
multiple equilibrium problem is sometimes calledfull implementation. For brevity, l drop the 
word "full" and simply refer to it here as implementation. 
To this point, the discussion has focussed on implementing a specific allocation rule. 
More generally, one can talk about implementing collections of allocation rules, or soc ial choice 
sets . For example, one might wish to implement the set of competitive equilibria rather that 
one particular selection from the competitive equilibrium correspondence. The theoretical issues 
of implementing correspondences are in many ways the same as the issues that arise in 
implementing specific allocation rules (social choice functions), so, for simplicity we will 
mostly concentrate on allocation rules.3
The first equilibrium concept to be applied to the implementation problem was dominant 
strategy equilibrium. This equilibtium concept has two important features. First, it circumvents 
the difficult problem of how to model players' expectations of other players' deceptions. Ir 
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something is a dominant strategy equilibium, then nobody cares how other individuals are 
behaving - or at least such expectations will not usually affect behavior. Second, and for more 
subtle reasons, it trivializes the second half of the implementation problem. Dominant strategy 
incentive compatibility very nearly implies that any multiple equilibria can be avoided.4 This
in tum implies that little generality is lost in restricting attention to direct mechanisms if' dominant 
strategy equilibrium is the solution concept. 
Of course the cost of these simplifications is known to be steep. Specifically, the Gibbard­
Satterthwaite theorem tells us that if we consider sufficiently broad domains then practically 
nothing is implementable in dominant strategies. The reason is the difficulty of satifying incentive 
compatibility. In their terms, nontrivial strategy-proof allocation mles generally do not exist. 
Domain restrictions are needed before it becomes possible to implement interesting allocation 
mles.5
While it would have been convenient to have obtained more positive results with 
dominant strategy mechanisms, it is unfortunately not the case. The natural next step was to 
explore the implications of implementation in Nash equilibrium.6 Using Nash equilibrium as the
solution concept means that individual expectations about other individuals' deceptions are 
modelled explicitly and are important. In the Nash implementation approach, the assumption 
that players know nothing about their opponents' private info1mation is replaced by the 
assumption that everyone's private information is common knowledge among the individuals.7
For this reason, this line of research is appropriately viewed as "implementation with complete 
information." 
The most promising applications of the complete information approach would probably be Lo 
contracting between two agents. In such situations, it may often be the case that the two 
contracting parties are relatively well informed about each others' preferences and beliefs, but the 
planner (or the courts that will be enforcing the contract) is poorly informed about their 
preferences and beliefs. In this case, the mechanism may be thought of as a state-contingent 
contract that the players agree to before the state of the world (including their preferences) is 
realized. Such an interpretation might also apply to relatively small groups such as committees 
and legislatures, who interact frequently enough that they become relatively well-informed about 
each others' preferences. On the other hand, this raises the problem that these static models are 
least applicable where agents interact frequently enough to know each others' preferences, since 
reputation building and supergame considerations become important. 
Another important difference with Nash implementation as compared with dominant strategy 
implementation is that the multiple equilibrium problem rears its ugly head. While the problem 
with dominant strategy implementation was incentive compatibility (strategy-proofness) the 
problem with Nash implementation is multiple equilibria. This is not surprising, as it is 
relatively difficult to construct game forms which have dominant strategies across a range of 
preference profiles, but it is easy to construct games with Nash equilibria. However, it is more 
difficult to construct games with unique Nash equilibrium. 
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The incentive compatibility issue becomes trivial for many domains because the 
redundancy of the individuals' information enables the planner to use the direct mechanism 
equivalent of "forcing contracts, " where a universally bad outcome is enforced unless all the 
reports of private infmmation agree. 8 For almost any allocation rule, it is possible to use such 
constructions to make truthful reporting a Nash equilibrium in a game where everyone reports the 
economy-wide profile of private information. Unfortunately, in some of these constructions 
almost any profile of mutually consistent deceptions is also a Nash equilibrium. Thus the Lum 
from Dominant Strategy implementation to Nash implementation turns the problem around 
completely so the focus is almost entirely .on the multiple equilibrium problem rather than being 
almost entirely on the incentive compatibility problem. 
Because of this multiple equilibrium problem, it is no longer sufficient to restrict aLtention to 
direct mechansims.9 The constrnctions required to "weed out" undesirable or extraneous Nash
equilibtia involve adding nuisance components to individual messages besides simply requesting 
individuals to submit an announcement of their information. The nature of the message spaces 
differ from those used in dominant strategy implementation in two ways: (1) players report 
profiles of private information, (2) nuisance messages are used. 
Finally, we reach the topic of this paper: Bayesian Nash implementation, or simply Bayesian 
implementation. This approach combines features of the dominant strategy approach and the Nash 
approach. Not only is the planner incompletely informed, but now individuals have trnly private 
infmmation - they know things that the other individuals do not know. If this private 
information is sufficiently exclusive10 then there is no role at all for forcing contracts.
However, unlike the dominant strategy approach some additional structure is imposed on the 
priors players have about other players' private information. The incentive compatibiliLy 
conditions of strategy-proofness are replaced by "Bayesian incentive compatibility" conditions 
in which individuals condition on their priors and on specific expectations about the deceptions of 
the other individuals. Thus, like Nash equilibrium, optimal equilibrium behavior depends upon 
expectations about other individuals' behavior. For this reason, the potential difficulty of mulliple 
equilbrium that arose in Nash equilibrium is still present.11
Thus, unlike either dominant strategy implementation or complete information Nash 
implementation, Bayesian implementation distinctly has two components to it - incentive 
compatibility and multiple equilibrium. As a result it should not be surprising that there are 
really two distinct literatures that have developed. One literature, easily the larger and more 
applied of the two, explores the implications of incentive compatibility. The other line of 
research,.the.morerecent ofthe two, explores the implications of the multiple equilibrium 
problem, attempts to characterize exactly when it can be overcome, and provides some clues 
about the nature of the indirect mechanisms that need to be used to eliminate undesirable 
equilbria. The latter approach is also beginning to investigate implementation using refinements 
of Bayesian equilibrium, an apporach that has been applied in complete information Nash 
implementation as well. Refinements help mitigate the multiple equilibrium problem, and for 
some domains solve the problem entirely. 
5 
The remainder of this paper focuses on the less well-known and more recent line of 
work on the multiple equilibrium problem, and for the most part ignores the now vast literature 
on Bayesian incentive compatibility.12 Section 2 offers three simple examples to illustrate the
multiple equilibrium problem that can arise, and to illustrate how it can or cannot be avoided. 
Section 3 presents a simple and useful characterization theorem about unique implementation in 
Bayesian equilibrium, and gives a detailed proof the the result. Section 4 catalogs a variety of 
alternative characterizations, explains the role of different assumptions, and draws some 
comparisons with complete infomation Nash implementation. Section 5 investigates some 
extensions of the usual Bayesian mechanism design approach, where the assumptions of 
committment and control are relaxed somewhat, and where refinements of Bayesian equilibrium 
are used. Section 6 raises and discusses without resolution some issues that need to be confronted 
more carefully and systematically in the near future. 
2. Some Examples
Example A 
This is based on early example to illustrate the multiple equilibrium problem in Bayesian 
implementation that appeared in Postlewaite and Schmeidler [1986]. There are three agents and 
two equally likely states of the world, s, s '. Agent 1 is uninformed. Agents 2 and 3 are
pe1fectly informed.13 There are three feasible alternatives, A = {a, b,  c } . State-contingent










Thus, player 1 's preference between a and b is always the opposite of the informed players'
preferences between a and b .  Everyone has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function at each
state which assigns a utility index of 1 to the first choice, 0 to the last choice, and v > 1/2 to the 
middle choice. The planner is player l 's twin brother and he wishes to implement x, given by 
x( s) = b , x(s') = a .
If a direct mechanism is used where truth is an equilibrium strategy, then only players 2 and 
3 reportmessages, .. andthe.outcome function g mustlook like 








Figure 1. Direct game 
If the direct game were not as in Figure 1, then either truth would not be an equilibrium strategy 
or g (s , s) :;t. b or g (s ', s ') :;t. a .
But this game also has a non-truthful equilib1ium in which agents 2 and 3 always lie, as well 
as two pooling equilibria, where 2 and 3 either always reports s or always report s '. In fact, the
lying equilibrium makes both informed agents better off and makes the planner (and agent 1) 
worse off.14 Therefore, we see that some indirect reporting is necessary to avoid the bad
equilibria. 
The way to accomplish this is by giving player 1 some messages which change the outcome 
function g(m2, m3).  It has been observed by Mookhe1jee and Reichelstein [1990] that it may be
possible to "selectively eliminate" the bad equilibria by giving player 1 exactly one message for 
each equilibrium (of course these new messages may add new equilibria, but that will be dealt 
with later). Matsushima [1990a] has observed that we may then label these new messages by the 
equilibrium strategies of the players in the direct game. In this example, it turns out that all of 
the non-truthful equilibria can be eliminated in the same way so that we only need to give agent 1 
two strategies, which we call "truth" and "not tluth." One may think of these strategies of player 
1 as being an announcement of whether he knows the other players are using the good equilbriurn 
(truth) or one of the bad equilibria (not truth). The outcome function is: 
s 









c s c 
I a s a 
"truth" "not trnth" 
Figure 2. Indirect mechanism to implement 






It is easily verified that this indirect mechanism solves the implementation problem in this 
example. However, notice that there are still two equilibria. One corresponds to the LruLhful 
strategy of the direct game (with agent 1 saying "truth"). The other has agenl 1 saying "nol LruLh," 
agent 2 always lying, and agent 3 always telling the truth. Both equilibria produce x as the 
equilibrium outcome. 
It is critical in the above example that v > .5, that is, it is more valuable to player I to 
receive c in both states than it is for player 1 to receive either a in both states orb in both states. 
If this is not the case, then it may be impossible to implement the desired social choice f'unclion 
because only one of the pooling equilibria can be selectively eliminated. This problem is vividly 
illustrated in example C below. However, as we will see in section 3, the existence of a Lransf'cr 
good (money) with no income effects will usually solve the problem even if v < .5. 
Example B: Double auctions 
In simple two-agent bargaining problems where the use of double auctions has been 
explored, a single seller owns an indivisible object which he values at vs . A single buyer values 
it at vb . These values are each private info1mation to the respective party. An interesting special 
case is when it is common knowledge that vs and vb are independently drawn from a uniform 
distribution on [O, 1]. An allocation rule is a mapping which assigns a probability of a transfer 
p (vs , vb ) and a transfer payment t (vs , vb ) for any (vs , vb ) E [0, l f It is well known (Chalte1jce
and Samuelson [1983], Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983]) that of all incentive compatible 
allocation rules, the one that maximizes the expected sum of buyer surplus plus seller surplus is: 
p (v,. , v& ) � { �
1if Vs �Vb - 4 
othe1wise 
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This is equivalant in (interim) expected utility to the allocation mle resulting from a linear bidding 
equilibrium of the split-the-difference double auction, where a buyer submits bid b and a seller 
submits an offer s and the buyer gets the object if and only if b 2 s .  If trade occurs, a transfer
of b ; s is made from the buyer to the seller. The equilibrium bidding functions are 
B (vb ) =  min( vb , � vb + 112 S (vs )= max( vs , � vs + ± ).
Unfortunately, the double auction with these rules, or in fact any direct mechanism yielding 
an allocation rule which is interim equilivant to this one is plagued by multiple equilibria. 
Satterthwaite and Williams [1989], and Leinger, Linhart and Radner (1989] show that there is a 
continuum of multiple equilibria. 
In turns out that the efficiency properties of this allocation rule allow us to implement it, 
essentially uniquely. All of the extraneous, inefficient equilbria can be selectively eliminated. 
Details will be given in section 5. 
Example C:  Public goods 
Consider the following simple public goods problem without side payments. There are two 
feasible public good decisions, A = { a , b } . There are 3 agents, each of whom either strictly 
prefers a to b (type ta ) or strictly prefers b to a (type tb ). Each knows his own type. It is 
common knowledge that each player's type was an independent draw with prob C ta)  = q ,  prob 
(tb )  = 1 - q .  An allocation rule is a mapping from the set of eight possible type profiles to a 
probability p of deciding " a" .  
An optimal (by many criteria) allocation rule x, selects a with probability 1 if at least two 
players are type ta and selects b with probability 1 if at least two players are type tb . This is the 
majority rule solution, it maximizes ex ante welfare, it is anonymous, incentive compatible, and all 
sorts of other nice things. It is even fully implementable in dominant strategies!! However, for 
some values of q ,  x is not Bayesian implementable. The reason is that if q is large, then the 
allocation rule "always a" is a Bayesian equilbrium outcome in any mechanism for which x is a 
Bayesian equilibrium outcome. If q is small, then "always b" is an equilbrium outcome in any 
mechanism where x is an equilbrium outcome. Therefore, x is implementable only if q is 
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sufficiently close to t - i.e. only if players have poor infonnation about each other. 
It is instmctive to see exactly why this is tme. Suppose we have a mechanism for which x 
is an equilibrium outcome. Then it must be that equilibrium strategies exist which produce 
outcomes as in Figure 3. (Player 3 is the row player. Player 2 is the column player, and Player 1 
is the matrix player.) 
Player 2 




C52(ta ) C52(tb )  
a b 
b b 
Figure 3. Equilibrnm resulting in x, 
with players using cr. 
Consider the strategy profile 0, where 01{) = cri Cta ) is a constant strategy for all i .  That is
everyone uses cr, but acts as if their types were always ta . This produces the outcomes given in
Figure 4. 
Player 2 




C52Cta ) C52(tb )  
a a 
a a 
Figure 4. Equilibrum with players using 
0, yielding "always a"
10 
We now can show that if q > '>15 then <J will be an equilibrium. Suppose not. Then some
player, say player 1, must have a message available to him, m ,  so that g (<J_1 , m )  = b .  Bul this 
means that g (a_1 ,  m )  produces the allocation mle in figure 5.  
Player 3 
Player 2 
cr2Cta ) <J2(tb )  
b ? 
? ? 
Figure 5. Outcome if players 2 and 3 use 
a and player 1 uses m .  
Now observe that no matter what the "?" entries are in Figure 5, player 1 is better of using 
m instead of a 1 (tb )  when he is type tb , if everyone else uses a and q > '>15. Therefore 0 is not
an equilibrium, a contradition. If 1 - q > '>15, a similar argument shows that the constant slrategy
<JO = a (tb ) is a Bayesian equilibrium.
3 .  A Simple and Useful Characterization Theorem 
As of the writing of this survey, there are quite a few different characterizations of social 
choice correspondences that are implementable by Bayesian equilibrium (Postlewaite and 
Schmeidler [1986], Palfrey and Srivastava [1989a, 1989b], Jackson [1991], Mookhe1jee and 
Reichelstein [1990], Matsushima [1990a, 1990b], and others). These characterizations differ from 
each other in their assumptions about the number of individuals, the existence of money transfers, 
the finiteness of the space of individual private information, the amount of conflict between 
individual preferences, the amount of redundancy in the individuals' private information, and a 
number of other specifics. The next section will discuss differences between the various 
characterizations in more detail. In this section, a very simple one is presented in detail. This 
characterization is new. It is suggested by example A of the previous section in which the 
presence of an uninformed agent is exploited to "break" the mutual deceptions of the informed 
agents. 
Consider an environment with a stmcture of private information of the following sort. 
There is a set of feasible alternatives, A ,  and a continuously transferable good that everyone 
values (call it money), that is in fixed supply, W. Let 
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D = { (w1 , .  . .  , wN ) E !Rn I w 1 + · · · + wN = W}, be the set of feasible transfers, so arbitrarily 
negative transfer payments are feasible. There are N 2". 2 individuals, and each individual i may 
be one of Ti possible types, where Ti is finite. An allocation rule, x ( t )  = (a ( t ) ,  w ( t) ), is a 
mapping from T = T 1 x · · · x TN into A x D . The set of feasible allocation rules is X . Each 
individual i has preferences over A that depend on T ,  and these preferences are represented by a 
Von Neumann-Morgenstem utility index Vi (a , t )  for a E A and t E T .  Given an allocation 
(a , w ,  t ), individual i's utility is Ui (a , w ,  t) = Vi (a , t) + wi . 
The structure of private information is that there is a common prior over profiles of types, 
denoted q ( t )  and we assume q ( t )  > 0 for all t E T .  This latter assumption is called diffus e 
information (Palfrey and Srivastava [1989a, 1989b]). Individuals follow Bayes rule, so that 
individual i ,  conditional on having observed ti , updates his prior over T _i by q Ct- i I U =
q ( t )  I hL; EL; q ( 'C_i ' ti ) .
A mechanism consists of a Cartesian product of individual message spaces, 
M = M 1 x · · · x MN and an outcome function g : M --7 A x D. A strategy15 for player i, Cii, is
a function from Ti to Mi . Given a strategy profile Ci =  (0 1, . . . , CTN) ,  denote Ci_i = 
(0 1, . . . , Ci i_ 1 ,G i+l• . . .  , CTN ) .  The strategy Ci is a Bayesian equilibrium to the mechanism (M, g) 
if, for all i , for all ti E Ti , and for all mi E Mi 
Given an environment, (A , q ,  T) ,  an allocation rnle x is implementable in Baysian equilibrum if 
there exists a mechnism (M, g )  with the following properties: 
(1) There exists a Bayesian equilibrium to (M , g ). 
(2) If CT is an equilbrium to (M, g )  then g (0( t )) = x ( t )  for all t .  
Summarizing, we are maintaining the following assumptions throughout this section. 
Assumption 1 :  
Assumption 2: 
Assumption 3 :  
Assumption 4: 
Assumption 5: 
N 2". 2 
I Tl < oo 
Unlimited balanced transfers without income effects 
Common prior on T 
Diffuse information 
Finally, we make the following assumption. 
Assumption 6 (An Uninformed Player): I T 11 = 1 
This assumption, or anything resembling it, cannot be found in any general implementation 
theorem of which I am aware. Nonetheless, it underlies a number of examples in the literature. 
The reason that uninformed individuals make the· task of eliminating unwanted equilibria so 
much easier is quite subtle, but very powerful. First, note that the presence of this individual 
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has no effect on the set of incentive compatible allocations. Second, the way a planner eliminates 
unwanted equilibria is by offering rewards to individuals for acting as stool pigeons and 
reporting undesirable strategizing by themselves and others to the planner. Of course the problem 
faced by the plaimer is how to design incentives for such behavior without encouraging stool 
pigeons to falsely report that deceptions are being employed. Thus it is quite difficult to design 
such selective incentives if the planner does not know an individual's preferences. However, if an 
individual does not have any private information, the planner knows exactly how to design the 
stool pigeon rewards for that individual. 
In order to understand the statement of the theorem, we need to introduce a bit more 
notation. Suppose we have a direct mechanism, so that Mi = Ti for all i and the outcome
function g : M  ---7A x D is therefore simply an allocation rnle x .  (Henceforth, we will write a 
direct mechanism (T , x ). )  Then a strategy for player i is simply any mapping from Ti into itself. 
We call the identity mapping from Ti to Ti the truthful strategy for i ,  denoted Ii and generally 
call any strategy for i in the direct mechanism a deception by i, denoted ai . A pro tile of 
deceptions by the individuals other than the uninformed individual is called a joint deception and 
is written a=(ai, . . .  , aN ) , and the profile of deceptions by everyone except for i is written a_i. 
Any joint deception induces a probability distribution over the reported types of the informed 
individuals, denoted q cv and also induces a new allocation rnle, x a defined by x a.C t )  = x (a( t )) 
for all t E T. Fonnally q a is defined by
qa.(t) = Lcrn-l(t)q(t) 
where a-1 ( t ) = {'tE T I a('t)  = t } .  
Following the terminology of Matsushima [1990a], a is called a consistent deception if q ex = q .  
That is, a joint deception is consistent if it generates the same distribution of reports by the 
informed individuals as if they had all used their trnthful strategies. 
Assumption 7 (No Consistent Deceptions): q a -:f. q \;/ a -:f. I
It is well known that a necessary condition for Bayesian implementation is that x is 
implementable only if it is incentive compatible . An allocation rule x is incentive compatible if 
the truthful strategy profile is a Bayesian equilibrium of the direct mechanism (T , x ) . That is:
Definition 1 :  An allocation rule x is incentive compatible if for all i and for all ti , 'ti E Ti 
Theorem 1. Under assumptions 1-7, x is incentive compatible if and only if x is implementable. 
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Proof: "If' follows from standard results by Hanis and Townsend [ 1981], Myerson [ 1979 J and 
others. "Only if' is more complicated. As in all characterization proofs in implementation theory, 
a general mechanism is constructed. In this case the message spaces can be simply given by: 
M; = T; i = 2, . . .  N 
That is, all individuals with private infonnation simply send reports of that private 
infonnation. The uninformed individual requests a supplemental balanced transfer as a func tion or 
the reported types of the other individuals. This supplemental transfer rule must be either the 0 
function or must have the property that the uninfonned individual's expected transfer under the 
true type distribution is negative. The outcome function if agents 2, . . .  , N report t '  and agent 
reports w O is: 
g(m) = (a ( t '),w ( t ') + w( t ')) 
We claim that this mechanism uniquely implements x. That is, there is a unique Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium which produces x as the equilib1ium allocation rule. Why does this mechanism 
work? First observe that since x is incentive compatible, it is a mutual best response for all the 
privately infonned individuals to report truthfully if the uninfonned agent reports 0. IL is strictly 
optimal for the uninfon ed individual to request 0, given everyone else tells the truth. Hence x 1s 
an equilibrium outcome, and is the only equilibrium with truthful reporting by the informed 
individuals. 
Can there exist an equilibrium with the infonned individuals using a joint deception a? No. 
If they use the deception a, then the probability distribution of reports is q a ·  Since q a 7' q, 
there exists t such that q aC t )  > q ( t ). Therefore there exists w such that Kw· q < 0 and 
Kw· q a > 0 for all K > 0. Therefore, 0 is not a best response. By choosing K large, we can 
make Kw ·q a arbitrarly large. But since Kw· q a can be made arbitrarly large he has no best 
response when the infonned individuals use deception a. Therefore there is no equilibtium with 
the informed individuals using deception a. QED 
This construction has several notable features. First, and most important, is the optional use 
of supplementary side payments by the uninfonned agent. The planner (via a message space 
restriction) specifically disallows any supplemental request by the uninfonned agent that would 
make him better off were the inf01med individuals adopting truthful reporting strategies. Since x 
is incentive compatible, this implies that x is still an equilibrium outcome in the expanded indirect 
mechanism (and the uninfonned player sends 0). On the other hand, suppose a were an 
equilibrium in the direct mechansm ( T  ,x ). Then a is no longer an equilibrium in the expanded 
mechanism because q a 7' q implies that there exists a proposal w E M 1 where the uninfonned 
individual prefers (a a, w a + w a) to x a = (a a ,  w a>· In the parlance of Mookherjee and 
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Reichelstein [1990], Xa is "selectively eliminated" from being an equilibr ium outcome by allowing 
the uninformed agent to propose w .  Finally, we have to make sure that the mechanism has been 
carefully constructed to avoid the addition of any new equilibrium which involves w 7:- 0. No 
such equiliblium can arise because for any proposal w 7:- 0 the uninfo1med agent might want to 
make, the proposal 2w makes him even better off. 
Thus we see that there are three goals to accomplish in the construction. One may make a 
loose, if somewhat morbid, analogy with the medical practice of surgically removing diseased 
tissue. Goal number one is to remove the unwanted tissue (bad equilibrium). Goal number two is 
to not remove the healthy tissue (good equilibrium). Goal number three is to make this selective 
removal sanitary, without creating a "secondary infection" (creating new unwanted equilibrium). 
All constructions of which I am aware have this structure, and the proofs consist of establishing 
that the constructed mechanism accomplishes these three goals. 
In general, the solution is not as simple as I have described, either because there usually 
does not exist a completely uninformed agent, or because there exist consistent deceptions (as for 
example would be the case with a continuum of types), or because side payments are infeasible or 
restricted. These lead to complications in several ways: by necessitating different individuals Lo 
play the role of breaking different undesirable equilibrium, depending on which equilibrium is to 
be excised; by needing to allow proposed allocations that differ in the "public decision" besides 
simply supplementing the money transfers; by restlicting proposals to be ones that make all 
possible types of the proposer worse off if everyone is adopting truthful strategies; and by having 
some components of joint messages "incompatible"16 with each other. These and other
complications are dealt with in Section 4. We next tum from sufficient conditions to necessary 
conditions. 
Necessary Condition: Monotonicity 
It is fairly well-known now in the literature on implementation via Nash equilibrium with 
complete information that a social choice function must satisfy a monotonitity condition in order 
to be implementable. This condition, the importance of which relative to implementation theory 
was first recognized by Eric Maskin l1977], roughly states that if some alternative is the social 
choice for one profile of preferences, R, and we consider another profile in the domain, R ' , where 
that alternative does not go down in anyone's preference ranking relative to any other alternative, 
then it must also be the social choice for the new profile. This property was originally viewed as 
a desirable-normative·criterion without consideration of its implications for equilibrium of 
noncooperative games.17 
Formally, we have the following definition (for correspondences):18 
Definition 2: A social choice correspondence F is monotonic if, for all R, R' 
If: (a)x E F ( R) 
(b) \Ii ,y xR;y -j xR;' y 
Then x E F ( R ') 
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What is the connection to noncooperative game theory that Maskin noticed? It is most easily seen 
by considering a slightly rearranged statement of the definition. 
Definition 3 :  A social choice correspondence F is monotonic if for all R, R' 
If: (a) x E F(R) 
(b) x ri_ F(R') 
:::3 i ,  y such that xR;y and yP/x. 
Henceforth we will call i a "test agent" and ya "test allocation," or (x,y) a "test pair."19
Now it is almost trivial to see why monotonicity is neccessary for Nash implementation. Suppose 
F is Nash implementable and let x E F ( R) and x nomem F ( R '). Then there exists a 
mechanism in which g ( m )  = x for some m E M and m is an equilib1ium at R. But m is not an 
equilbrium at R', so there must be some i ,mi , y such thaty = g (m_; ,mi )P,.' g ( m )  = x. But, 
since m is an equilib1ium at R, x R;y. Therefore, we see that there exists a test agent i and a test 
allocation y = g (ni_i, mi) which makes x not an equilibrium at R '. This gives: 
Theorem 2: If F is Nash implementable then F is monotonic. 
Turning to incomplete information, intuition suggests that, since Bayesiitn Nash equilibriu111 
is simply a more general statement of Nash equilibrium there should exist an appropriate 
restatement of monotonicity that applies to Bayesian implementation. The first such extension was 
identified by Postlewaite and Schmeidler [1986], and it captures exactly the notion of a test agent 
and a test allocation. The critical difference is that the relevant notion of an outcome of a 
Bayesian game is now a function mapping type profiles into feasable allocations whereas one 
traditionally thinks of the equilibrium outcome of a complete information game as a single 
alternative. While one can of course build up such functions by concatenating all of the complete 
information outcomes for different profiles, this is not how monotonicity is usually stated with 
complete infomation. 
This reinterpretation of outcomes of games as allocation rules means that "test allocations" 
are substituted with "test allocation rules." Since we look at allocation rules, we can no longer 
state monotonicity by simply comparing equilibrium outcomes at two specific type profiles (as we 
compared R and R' in the otiginal definition of monotonity), but must compare two strategy 
profiles, or alternatively, two deception. Thus, instead of comparing all pairs (R, R ') we consider 
all functions a =  (a1, • • •  , aN) with ai : Ti -j Ti. For a given a and a given t ,  the pair 
(t ,a( t )) is analogous to the pair (R ,R') in the original definition of monotonicity. Si111ilarly, the 
preferences, R;. are replaced by interim preferences R; (ti ) ,  where x R; (t; )y iff 
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Lt .eT . q (t_; I t; )U; (x( t ) , t)  � Lt .er. q (t_; I t; )U; (y ( t ) , t ) . A social choice correspondence is
-/ -I -J I 
then represented as a collection of social choice functions, and so is often called a social choice 
set. With this in mind we have (assuming diffuse infonnation): 
Definition 4: F is Bayesian Monotonic if\I a= (a
1
, . . . , ell) with ai : yi � Ti , \;/ i
If: ( 1) x : T � A E F 
(2) \:f i , s i , y : y-i � A 
Then Xa. E F 
Alternatively, we may write, instead of (2) 
(2') 'V i ,  si , y : T � A xR; (ti )y (·I a(s; )) 'V t; E yi
where xR i (t; )y ('I a(s i )) means
Lt -ieT_;qi (t-i I ti ) [ ui (x( t ), t )  - u;(y(t_; ,ai (s; )) ,t)J � 0
As was the case with the original monotonicity condition this can be rewritten in te1ms of 
the existence of a test agent i and a test allocation rule y . 
Definition 5: F is Bayesian monotonic if for all a and for all x E F, if Xa. fi. F then ::::3 
i ,  si E T
i , y  : T �A such that
_xR
i 
(t; )y  ('I a(s; )) \I ti E yi
To prove that Bayesian monotonicity is necessary for implementation in Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium involves essentially the same argument used in Theorem 2. Suppose x E F, 
Xa. fl. F, and F is Bayesian implementable. Then since x E F, there exists a set of equilibrium 
strategies which produce x, call it cr. The joint strategy O'a. defined by cr� . (t; ) = cri (a; (t; )) for all 
I 
i and ti yields outcome Xa. Since this is not an equilibrium, some player i has some type s; and 
some alternative message mi such that g (a ;/ (t _i ), m;}PJs; )xa. Let y be the allocation de lined
-/ 
by g when everyone else uses a-i and i always sends the message m; , so y = g (a-i (t_; ), m; ) .
Then xR 
i 
(t; )y  \:f t; since cr i s  an equilbrium, so y is a test allocation rule that satifies the required
inequality conditions. Observe that by the way y was constructed (with i using a "constant" 
17 
strategy mi , this means that we may write y -i : T -i � A instead of y : T � A and this generates
the definition of Bayesian monotoniciy given in (2). Summarizing: 
Theorem 3 :  If F is Bayesian Nash implementable then F is Bayesian monotonic. 
Returning to Theorem 1 briefly, we can see exactly why Bayesian monotonicity is satisfied 
under Assumptions 1-7. Since we assumed that every deception a generates a probability of 
reported types different from q (the "no consistent deceptions" assumption), this guarantees that 
for any a, the uninformed agent (agent 1) is one such test agent, and there will always exist a test 
allocation rule y = w simply involving a type contingent transfer scheme (y : r-1 � A )  that
staisfies xR 1y and ya  f5 1 x a· Notice that since 1 is uninfo1med - he has only one type - the
dependence of R 1 on t 1 is suppressed.
Also obse1ve that all players utility functions are such that their preferences for lotteries over 
transfers do not depend on their type. Thus, if types are independently distributed, so we may 
write q ( t) = q 1(t1) · · · qN (tN )  for any t E T , a similar result holds, using a nearly identical
construction. 20
4. Other Characterizations
The characterization in section 2 is special in a number of ways. The characterizations that 
have appeared in the literature are usually stated so that they apply to a much broader class of 
environments than ones that satisfy Assumptions 1-7. 
This section explores a few of these alternative characterizations. First, we consider pure 
exchange environments where income effects and limited transfers do not permit the same kind of 
construction as the one used in the last section. Second we consider generalizations of pure 
exchange environments called "economic" environments. The basic ingredient in such 
environments is that there are always differences in preference between some individuals in the 
population. In particular, too much agreement on a most-preferred alternative is ruled out. Third, 
we explore the implications of relaxing the assumption of diffuse info1mation. This provides 
results for the "grey area" between complete and incomplete information. 
A. Pure exchange environments 
A feasible allocation of resources in a private goods economy with L commodities and N 
N 
agents is a collection of individual allocations a = (a 1, . . . , aN) E IR�L such that L,ai l ::::; w1 for
i=l 
all!, where ro1 is the aggregate endowment of commodity l. Obse1ve that exact balancing of 
resources is not imposed, although many of the results below can also be proved when exact 
balancing is required.21 We denote by A the set of all such feasible allocations. There are a set
of states of the economy, S .  Given a states E S, we denote individual i's utility of ai is states
by U i (ai , s) and assume it is strictly increasing in ai l for all l ,  and s E S .  The state also
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captures information players may have about each other. To maintain consistency with the 
notation introduced in section 3, there are a finite set of types for each i ,  denoted Ti, so the set of 
states of the economy are the set of all vectors of types.22 Let X = {x : T � A}.
The definitions of incentive compatibility and Bayesian Monotonicity are the same for pure 
exchange economies as for the environments discussed in the previous section. However, because 
(a) we are not guaranteed the existence of an uninformed agent, (b) there are limitations on 
transfers and (c) there are income effects, it becomes very helpful to require at least three agents. 
While this is not a necessary condition for implementation, it simplifies the problem considerably, 
as will be apparent below. 
For the case where information is diffuse, the set of Bayesian implementable allocations is 
characterized as a special case of a result in Palfrey and Srivastava [1989b].23 One version of that
result, adapted to our current notation and assumptions is: 
Theorem 4: If T is finite, information is diffuse and A consists of pure exchange allocations
then x is Bayesian implementable if and only if it is incentive compatible and Bayesian 
monotonic. 
Proof: "Only if' follows from Theorem 2. "If' requires construction of a general mechanism. 
The following one works. For each i ,  let Mi = X x Ti x {O, 1, . . .  }, so each individual
announces a social choice function (allocation rule), a type, and a non-negative integer, ni . Let t' 
be the profile of reported types. If everyone reports x ,  and at least n - 1 agents report 0, then the 
outcome is x ( t ') .  If everyone except i reports x and 0 but agent i reports y * x ,  and any 
ni E {O, 1, . . .  }, then the outcome is: 
x ( t ') if y Pi (ti )x some ti E Ti
y ( t ') if x R 
i
(ti )y \I ti E Ti
For any other profile of reports the outcome is determined by an "integer game." The individual 
who announces the highest24 ni E {O, 1, . . .  } receives co and everyone else receives nothing.
This mechanism produces x as the unique equilbrium outcome. Clearly it is an equilibrium
for everyone to send the message (x , ti ,0) when type ti E T ,  since x is incentive compatible.
There can be no equilibrium with some i announcing y * x ,  or ni * 0 at some ti E Ti . First,
note that because of the integer game no such equilibrium could arise with i announcing a y 
which gives all resources to some j ":t i . Therefore any j * i is better off announcing an integer 
higher than any integers announced by anyone at any type (recall T is finite!).
Finally, if there were an equilibrium with individuals deceving via a, so that each j reported 
(x ,aj(tj ) , 0) at tj , then it must be that Xa = x .  Otherwise, since x is Bayesian monotonic there
would be an agent i and a type s i E Ti who could report y such that xR i (ti ) y (· I cx(s i )) Y ti E T
but y J5 i (si ) Xw so that individual would be better off reporting y than reporting x when he is
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type si E T'. • 
Matsushima [ I  990a J has produced a proof that uses an alternative construction where
undesirable (deceptive) equilibria arc broken by a designated test agent i (al who may report the 
joint deception a being used, and which results in a pre-defined test allocation y(aJ. A related 
idea underlies the construction by Mookherjee and Reichelstein [ 1990]. The point is that Dill' rna: 
either allow agents to announce alternative allocations y and allow y if it passes Lhe test i11 tl1c 
Bayesian monotonicity dclinition, or the planner can simply define a function that maps rq)lirtcd 
joint deceptions into the appropriate test allocations. 
B. "Eco nomic "  envi ronments 
Many economies do not fit exactly into the pure exchange setting described above. such as 
environments with public goods, or production and consumption externalities. Nevenhelcss. in 
many of these problems of interest, there is always some minimal degree of conllicting 
preferences between the individuals in the environment. 
For a broad class of these environments, virtually identical results to Theorem 3 can be 
proved. The basic insight, originally due to Maskin 's [ 1977) complete infonnation results. is that 
implementation problems may arise if a social choice correspondence fails to select nearly 
unanimous "best alternatives." For complete infonnation environments, we say an alternative is 
nearly unanimous at state s if at least N - 1 agents rank it at the top of their preference ordering 
at s. A social choice correspondence satisfies No Veto Power (NVP) if x E F ( s) whenever x 1s 
nearly unanimous al s. NVP is a very convenient sufficient condition for proving 
implementability of a monotonic SCC when N 2 3. 
In pure exchange environments with N 2 3, there is nothing even close to a nearly 
unanimous outcome, and consequently no auxilliary assumption is required. To generalize this, 
Jackson [1991) identified what he calls economic environments. This requires that" .. . ror any 
given social choice function and state, there are at least two agents who prefer to alter the social 
choice function at that state." (p. 9) In other words, no outcome is nearly unanimous at any 
state. 
For the case of diffuse infonnation, we have, formally: 
Definition 6: The environment is economic (E) if, for any a E A and t E T, there exist i =t j, 
and b1,b2 E A  such that b1P,(t,-)a and b2P;(t1)a.
Assumption 8: The enviomment is economic. 
This assumption is also made implicitly in Matsushima [ l 990b p. 8] who assumes that every type 
of every individual has a mos t preferred alternative that does not depend on the other players' 
types. This assumption is automatically guaranteed in pure exchange enviomments and also plays 
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a role in the earlier work by Palfrey and Srivastava [1989a, 1991a] on implementation using 
undominated Nash equilibrium. Formally, this assumption is: 
Assumption 9 (Matsushima [1990b]) : (Existence of known best element). The environment is 
economic and for every i and every ti E Ti there exists bi (ti )  E A such that
UJbi (ti ), t )  2'. Ui (a , t )  for all t_i E T _i , and for all a EA.
Notice that Assumption 9 combines two features. First, it requires that everyone have a most 
preferred alternative that doesn 't depend on the other players ' private inf01mation. Second, the 
implementation problem must be "economic. " These two components jointly require that N 2'. 3 .  
Theorem 5 :  If the implementation problem i s  economic, N 2'. 3 ,  T < 00 ,  and information is 
diffuse, then x is Bayesian implementable if and only if x is incentive compatible and Bayesian 
monotonic. 
Remarks about Theorem 5 :  Essentially the same proof as the one used to prove Theorem 4 works 
here. Jackson [1991] proves a more general version of Theorem 5 for correspondences in which 
he allows agents to have non-exclusive information. His proof also uses a different integer game , 
which he calls a matching game. It has the attractive feature that if A is finite then the message 
space is finite. Matsushima [1990b] proves a version of Theorem 5 using Assumption 9. 
C. Non-Exclusive Information 
The initial work on Bayesian implementation by Postlewaite and Schmeidler [ 1986, 1987) 
and Palfrey and Srivastava [1987] assumed non-exclusive information (NEI).25 If states are
represented by profiles of types, and players share a common prior q ,  then: 
Definition 7:  There is non-exclusive information (NEI), if, for all i and for all t_i there exists 
i; (t_i ) such that, for all ti * i; (t_i ), q (ti , t_i ) = 0. 
Thus non-exclusive information changes the assumption that q ( t )  > 0 for all t E T ,  in a
very special way. In particular, it implies that player i's type can be precisely inferred from 
knowledge of all the other players ' types. That is, q (t(t_i )  I t_i ) = 1 for all i and for all t_1 .
The reason _for_theinitiaUocus on these. infonnation strnctures was simple : incentive constraints 
are never binding in pure exchange economies. That is, for any allocation rule, x ,  one can 
always26 design a forcing contract so that x is an equilibrium outcome. Therefore, essentially the 
only hurdle for implementation is the multiple equilibrium problem. In this way, there is a close 
resemblance to Nash implementation with complete information. 
A useful insight gained from the case of non-exclusive information is that it encompases 
complete information as a special case.27 This means that Bayesian implementation is exactly the 
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natural generalization of Nash implementation thal one hoped it  would be. Whal i s  perhaps a 
little surprising and unfortunate about NEI is that the simplicity gained by circumvenLing ince ntive 
compatibility is lost in the complexity of stating a more complicated Bayesian monotonic i ly 
condition, needing a more complicated constructive proof, and requi ring an additional cond i tion,  
called closure. 
Closure is a property of a social choice coITespondence. Any new allocation rule that is an 
appropriate mixture of some collection of allocation rules that are in the social choice set must 
also lie in the social choice set. These mixtures involve splicing28 together a portion of one
allocation rule for all type profiles in one common knowledge event of T with a portion of
another allocation rule for all remaining type profiles in T.  Therefore, closure only has  bile i f  
(a) the common knowledge partition of  T consists of  at least two nonempty events and (b) the
social choice set F contains at least two allocation rules.29
Closure is most easily illustrated by an example with complete informalion and two type 
profiles, so T = { t , t ' } .  Suppose that x , y  E F and x ( t ) = a , x (t ') = a ' , y ( t ) = b ,  y (t ') = b '  
and a ,  a ', b ,  b '  are all distinct elements of A .  Then closure says x and Ji must also be in F, 
where x ( t ) = a , ,f (t ') = b ', Ji ( t ) = b ,  Ji (t ') = a '. Notice that closure implies, among other 
things, that with complete informalion a social choice sel may be oblained as lhe cross product o l' 
the images of a social choice correspondence. That is ,  with complete information, i f  F is a soc ia l
choice set  satisfying closure, then there exists a social choice coITespondence F : T �A such lhat
F = XI E TF ( t ) .  
In pure exchange environments, several results are known for the case of non-exclusive 
information. First, Theorem 4 extends in a natural way, with the exception that incentive 
compatibility is not required and, accordingly, joint deceptions that are incompatible30 can safely
be ignored. Thus monotonicity can be stated by 
Definition 8 (NEI monotonicity) : x is Bayesian Monotonic if, for all compatible a such lhat 
x a "#. x ,  there exists i ,  ti such that x R i ( a.i (ti )) y and y aP 
i (ti ) Xa.
A second result is that if we restrct attention to pure exchange economies where preferences 
are strictly concave and satisy a condition guaranteeing interior Walrasian equilibrium, lhen lhe 
Rational Expectations equilibrium coITespondence is Bayesian monotonic and therefore 
implementable when information is non-exclusive.3 1 Wettstein [1986] shows that if the inleriori ty
conditi on is dropped, we may still implement the "constrained" Rational Expectations equilibri um ,  
where demands are exogenously bounded by the aggregate endowment. Third, allocations which 
are interim envy-free are implementable with non-exclusive information. These and other 
applications of Bayesian monotonicity to pure exchange environments with non-exclusive 
information are found in Palfrey and Srivastava [1987]. 
Jackson [ 1991] extends these results with either exclusive or non-exclusive information in  
general economic  environments (Assumption (8)) and also provides a very general characlcrizalion 
for finite-type environments without the "economic" condition. He identifies a modification to 
Bayesian monotoni city which incorporates an interim version of the No Veto Power condition 
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used to prove sufficiency in Nash implementation. That combined condition is called 
Monotonicity-No-Veto (MNV). In fact MNV reduces to the separate conditions of monotonicity 
and NVP when information is complete. It is therefore not a necessary condition for 
implementation. 
5. Extensions
In this section we will discuss extensions in three different directions of the Bayesian 
implementation results summarized in the earlier section: 
(A) Refinements of Bayesian equilibrium 
(B) Relaxing the committment assumption (renegotiation and individual rationality) 
(C) Relaxing the control assumption (message space constraints and preplay communication 
between the agents). 
A. Refinements of Bayesian equilibrium 
The most obvious strengthening of Bayesian equiliblium, and the one that has received by 
far the greatest attention in mechanism design theory is Dominant Strategy Equilibrium. 
Unfortunately , as noted above, incentive compatibility in dominant strategies is generally very 
difficult to achieve, and when it can be achieved the multiple equilibrium problem does not arise. 
Palfrey and Srivastava [1989a] investigate the equilibrium refinement of Undominated 
Bayesian Equilibrium (UBE), which is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in which no player uses a 
weakly dominated strategy. Thus it combines the best response property of Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium with a dominance property. This refinement turns out to have a lot of cloul. 
The strength of this refinement is best seen by returning to the third example of Section 2. 
In that example, we were trying to implement majority preferences over two alternatives. 
However, it turns out that for most priors over types, that social choice function is not Bayesian 
monotonic. Neverthless, we observed that it was implementable in dominated strategies. How do 
we resolve this apparent paradox? It would seem that if x is implementable in dominant 
strategies then x should also be implementable in Bayesian equilibrium, but that is unfortunately 
not trne . 
The resolution to this apparent paradox is simple: all the extra equilibria that undermine the 
implementation of the majoritarian social choice rule involve the use of weakly dominated 
strategies. The question then is: What other social choice functions are not Bayesian monotonic 
but can be implemented in UBE? The answer is that if individual preferences do not depend on 
other players' types ("private values") then virtually any incentive compatible social choice 
function is UBE-implementable. 
The intuition behind this result borrows heavily from results about implementation with 
complete infonnation using the undominated refinement of Nash equilibrium (Palfrey and 
Srivastava [199 l a]). There it was shown that if preferences were value distingushed, then with at 
least three agents any social choice function or correspondence satisfying no veto power is 
implementable in Undominated Nash Equilibrium. 
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Preferences are strictly value distinguished if, for each i ,  ti :/:. ti ' , there exists a test pair of 
outcomes, (a , b ), such that aPJU b and bPi (t/)a . Weak value distinction allows for some weak 
preferences in the definition of the test pair. Thus value distriction is a condition that says two 
types are different if and only if their preferences are different.32
With incomplete information, it has been proved that if N :::::: 3, preferences are value 
distinguished and private, no one is ever completely indifferent over all outcomes, and best and 
worst elements exist for every type of every player, then a social choice function is incentive 
compatible if and only if it is implementable in UBE. If preferences are not value distinguished 
or depend on the entire profile of types, then a necessary condition must be satisfied that is 
weaker then Bayesian monotonicity, but is quite strong nonetheless. 
The proof for "private values" is long but straightforward, at least for the case of strict 
preferences. The idea is to have players announce their type twice (plus some nuisance 
messages). In equilibrium, only the first announcement, ti , matters. However, the mechanism is 
constructed so that the second announcement, t/, may (out of equilibrium) trigger the use of a test 
pair { a  (ti , t; ') , b (ti , t; ') } with the property that a (ti , t/) P i (ti ) b (ti , t; ') P i (t; ') a (ti , t; ') .  If
player i announces the pair (ti , ti ') ,  for which his corresponding test  pair is (a , b ) , then when the 
test pair is tr iggered, the outcome is b ,  which is preferred to a in state t/, but not in state ti . The
rest of the mechanism is set up so that, at state ti ' , the report (ti , ti ) is dominated by the report of 
(ti , ti ') ,  which will effectively prevent any joint deception from being an equilib1ium. To 
guarantee that there are no other equilibria, say with i reporting (ti , ti '), we introduce a new kind 
of integer game called "tailchasing. " In addition to announcing (ti , t/), each player also 
announces an integer. Whenever a player reports two different types then reporting the number M 
is weakly dominated by reporting any number larger than M .  Details may be found in Palfrey 
and Srivastava [1989a]. 
The restriction to private values and value-distinguished-types is qui te important. For one 
thing it mles out some applications which might be important, including bargaining and auctions 
with common or affiliated values. The reason these assumptions produce such strong results is 
that in order for a simple construction with test pairs, the choice of the test pair can ot depend on 
other players' types. And, if types were not value-distinguished (e.g., two types differ only in 
inf01mation about other players) then test pairs do not exist. 
The following example illustrates how common values can create implementation problems 
even when using the UBE refinement. This example is a "common-value majoritarian" social 
choice function. There are three players and A = { a , b } . Everyone has identical strict 
preferences, but different information. Each player can be one of two types, Ti = { ta J1; } . Types
are independently drawn, with q = prob { ta }  > '>/.5.  Each individual prefers a to b if and only if
there are at least two type ta players, otherwise everyone prefers b to a .  The social choice 
function, x, we would like to implement is the obvious one; select a if everyone prefers a to b ; 
select b if everyone prefers b to a . 
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Clearly x is incentive compatible, so that in a direct game everyone is better off honestly 
reporting his type than lying as long as everyone else is honestly reporting his type. However, 
one can show that there is also a pooling Bayesian equilibrium where everyone always claims to 
be type ta , so a is always selected. This additional equilibrium outcome arises in any game for 
which x is an equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, one can never "refine" this bad outcome away 
by eliminating weakly dominated strategies and using tailchasing or other elaborate construction 
techniques. Therefore, x is not implementable in UBE. 
The above example suggests that in some seemingly innocuous cases, implementation may 
require resorting to stronger refinements such as-those found in Kohlberg and Mertens [1986], or 
those based on sequential rationality such as sequential equilibrium or Pe1fect Bayesian 
equilibrium. Little is known about implementability using these refinements in games of 
incomplete infonnation. The work of Moore and Repullo [1988] and Abreu and Sen [1989] for 
subgame perfect equilibrium with complete information indicates that sequential rationality 
refinements do expand the set of implementable social choice functions, but to a lesser degree than 
mling out weakly dominated strategies. However, some of the "signaling " refinements of 
sequential equilibrium combine dominance-based refinements with sequential rationality, and so 
may permit the implementation of even more social choice functions. 
Abreu and Matsushima [1990] have taken a slightly different approach, examining 
implementation in iteratively undominated strategies. They obtain very strong results with finite 
types and conflicting preferences. In order to obtain these strong results , they relax the 
implementability definition. According to this relaxed definition , a social choice function is 
virtually implementable if there exists an "exactly" implementable (possibly random) social choice 
function that approximates it arbitrarily closely. This follows the earlier work of Matsushima 
[1988] and Abreu and Sen [1989b]. In addition to incentive compatibility , they identify a very 
weak n ecessary condition for implementation called measurability. The details of their 
constmctive proof are substaintally different from the ones presented earlier in this survey. An 
interesting discussion (and criticism) of the constmction appears in a subsequent note by Glazer 
and Rosenthal [1990]. 
B. The committment problem 
In the standard mechanism design problem, an uninformed planner or perhaps a collection o r  
uninformed players commit to a mechanism at the ex ante stage. In particular ,  they commi t to an 
outcome function and a message space. These completely detennine the rules according to which 
they exchange information and decide on outcomes. 
A large can of worms is opened when one attempts to relax the assumption that there are no 
constraints, other than feasibility , on the outcome function. Considerable attention has been 
focussed on the implications of impossing various kinds of restrictions on the kinds of outcome 
functions that may be commited to. For convenience, we divide the "limited committment" 
approaches into four broad categories : 
(B 1) Constraints on ex post allocations 
(B2) Durability 
(B3) Dynamic Contracting 
(B4) Information Leakage 
Bl. Constraints on ex post allocations 
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The two most ·common restrictions of the first type are ·  individual rationality and ex post 
efficiency. In the Bayesian implementation literature, the analysis of Ma, Moore and Turnbull 
[1988] carefully addresses issues of individual rationality. They construct a unique 
implementation of the Demski-Sappington optimal contract with two agents and two types. The 
individual rationality problem arises there because either agent may choose "non participaLion " al 
the message sending stage. One may view the individual rationality constraint as reinterpreting 
the outcome function g ( m )  as an "offer function, "  where the offer may be refused by any of the 
players , resulting in a status quo payoff G b ,  for some or all of the players. This is equivalanl to 
adding an extra stage at the end of the mechanism in which each agent chooses between G b and
g ( m ). In general, this may lead to feasibility problems, although not in the Ma , Moore,  and 
Turnbull [ 1988] setting. 
Individual rationality is frequently imposed in applications of the revelation principle to 
contracting problems. However, with the exception of the work by Ma , Moore , and Turnbull and 
realted work by Rajan [1989], most of the work on the multiple equilibrium problems in Bayesian 
mechanism design has paid little attention to the problem of individual rationality. 
The issue of ex post efficiency has been addresed in the complete info1mation literature by 
Maskin and Moore [1989] , in "renegotiation-proof' implementaton.33 Their work is moLivated by
the observation that in many of the constructive proofs, multiple equilibria are selectively 
eliminated by allowing the planner to "enforce " relatively arbitrary outcomes. For example, the 
test allocations that are used to break unwanted equilibria may be very inefficient. They explore 
the implications of requiring the outcome function to always be efficient. 
In order to impose this requirement , one has to assume that there is some sort of ex post 
bargaining process that follows the play of a mechanism and that always produces ex posL 
efficient allocations. This implies that we may write a function E (g ( m ), s )  which maps each 
realization of the outcome function to another outcome34 if the true state is s .  This £-function ,
or bargaining technology,35 is then taken as a transformation on the final outcomes that will arise
from any mechanism (M , g ). It is important to observe that E incorporates information that is not 
in the planner's information set - in particular, E depends on s .  This implies , among other 
things, that any efficient social choice function , f ,  is implementable with renegotiation relative to 
some E ,  namely E ( · , s )  = f ( s ). Thus it is not at all clear that we should view "renegotiation­
proofness" of this sort as a constraint, since it may (almost by assumption) make some non­
monotonic social choice functions implementable by embedding their implementability in the 
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technology. 
This approach is clearly intended to capture, in reduced form, the observation that the 
reporting of messages followed by a (temporary) outcome generated by the planner's outcome 
function is not the end of the game. Either the planner cannot reasonably commit to producing an 
outcome that he knows is inefficient, or the planner cannot prevent the players themselves from 
negotiating to a Pareto improvement. In either case, the implicit assumption is that there is a 
continuation game that follows the mechanism, and this continuation game always ends up 
selecting an efficient allocation. This raises some interesting new issues : What are examples of 
such continuation games that always lead to efficiency? . What -renegotiation functions E ( · , s ), 
can arise as unique equilibrium outcomes of such continuation games? The recent work by 
Rubenstein and Wolinsky [ 1989) offers one approach to this in a bargaining setting where a 
specific renegotiation process is proposed. Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey [ 1989) also suggest an 
approach in which the renegotiation functions themselves are part of the designed mechanisms. 
B2. Durability 
The problem of durability arises at the interim stage when one agent could propose to 
replace the mechanism with a new mechanism and all the other agents would agree to do so. 
There are many ways of formulating this problem,36 which is very closely related to the problem
of mechanism design by an informal principal.37
The fact that renegotiation takes place before any "official" messages have been sent 
distinguishes this class of variations on imperfect committment from the others. As the problem 
was originally formulated in Holmstrom and Myerson [ 1983) , the multiple equilibrium problem 
was not addressed. However, as Legros [ 1990) points out, the possibility of multiple equilibria 
suggests a reformulation, which he calls "strong durability. " 
Strong durability is a property of a mechanism-allocation rule pair, rather than being a 
property of allocation rules, as in Holmstrom and Myerson. The idea is that such a pair is 
strongly durable if the allocation 1ule is implemented by the mechanism and there does not exist 
mechanism that could be unanimously approved in a vote against the original mechanism that 
implements the allocation rule. An allocation rule is then called strongly durable38 if there exists
a mechanism such that the mechanism-allocation rule is strongly durable. Notice that an 
allocation may fail to be durable relative to its direct mechanism, but an indirect mechanism may 
exist that makes it strongly durable. 
One can then show a close connection between strong durability and interim efficiency. For 
example, in independent private value models, an allocation rule is strongly durable if and only if 
it  is inte1im efficient ! This contrasts with the results of Holmstrom-Myerson, where the leading 
example of that paper demonstrates that interim efficient allocation rules may not be durable. The 
reason for the difference is that Holmstrom-Myerson restrict attention to direct mechanisms. One 
can generalize the result of Legros [ 1990) in an interesting way. He (and Holmstrom and 
Myerson [ 1983)) only considers unanimous voting procedures. In fact, one can reformulate 
much of the model to allow for arbitrary (finite) renegotiation processes, as extensive form games 
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that are played prior to the mechanisim, the continution games of which are mechanisms. As long 
as side-payments are possible, then one can show that in independent private values models any 
interim efficient allocation rule is strongly durable with this more general definition.39
B3. Renegotiation in Dynamic Environments and (B4) Information Leakage 
In m any settings, it is optimal for the same mechanism to be applied over and over again in 
a multiperiod contracting problem (Stokey [1979]). However if player types are correlated across 
periods then all parties may wish to change the mechanism as time passes and the information 
structure evolves.40
At this point there has been very little work on the multiple equilbrium problem with 
renegotiation. The main reason for this is that sequential rationality is imposed in these models. 
The difficult issues of B ayesian implementation with sequential rationality are open questions. 
While characterization results for sequential rationality with complete infonnation are highly 
developed,41 there are no analogous results in Bayesian settings. Since dynamic contracting
problems seem to be one major direction the mechanism design approach is headed, this is an 
unfortunate gap in the current state of Bayesian implementation theory. 
For similar reasons, little is known about the problem of agents making inferences from the 
messages of other agents, and thus wishing to revise their message. This problem arises in the 
posterior implementation work of Green and Laffont [ 1987a]. Chakravorti [ 1989] explores some 
of the multiple equilibrium problems with implementation, using a stronger posterior requirement. 
C. The control assumption 
The standard approach to mechanism design assumes that the plam1er has complete control 
over the communication technology, and complete control over the outcome function. Issues 
concerning renegotiation involve some limitations on the planner's ability to credibly commit to an 
outcome function, but other issues may arise quite independently of the commitment abilities of 
the planner. One possibility, collusion by preplay communication, is illustrated by the following 
example. 
EXAMPLE: Collusion by preplay communication. 
There are two agents, who work for a principal. The principal is trying to decide between 
two differenLprojects. to. undertake. The agents h ave info1mation about different aspects of the 
projects , say its cost and some other dimension that the agents care about a lot, but the principal 
cares about very little, such as whether it requires much effort on the part of the agents. For 
simplicity, agent 1 can be type t 1 or type t2 and agent 2 can be type s 1 and s 2. If agent 1 is t 1 
then the principal wants to undertake project A and if agent 1 is t2 then the principal wants to 
undertake project B. Agent 2 only has information about the second dimension of the project that 
the principal doesn't care about. The agents' info1mation is independent, and the joint distribution 
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of types is common knowledge, with prob (t 1 ) = .5 and prob (s 1) = .4. The agents have idential
state contingent utility functions given in Figure 6. 
A 0 1 1 0 
B 1 0 0 1 
Figure 6 
Thus we see that the agents would prefer project A if the type profile were (t 1, s 1) or (t 2, s 2) and
prefer project B othe1wise. One can easily see that the planners social preferred allocation rnle, 





However, the direct mechanism that implements it can be undermined if the agents are able to 
communicate prior to playing the mechanism. That is, there exists an extensive form game which 
consists of a "cheaptalk" stage followed by the play of the direct mechanism, which contains an 
equilibrium outcome different from the one intended by the planner. 
Consider the following very simple form of preplay communication. Agent 2 tells agent 1 
whether he is s 1 or s 2. Then the agents play the mechanism. One equilib1ium of this two stage
game is for agent 1 to ignore what agent 2 · tells him and agent 2 al ways says he is type s 1 ,  and 
then players act truthfully in the direct mechanisms. This produces the planners choice. 
However, there is another equilibrium in which agent 2 tells agent 1 his true type, and agent 1 
reports trnthfully to the planner if and only if agent 2 tells him s 2. Thus, we see that some
mechanisms may uniquely implement social choice functions but are not immune to preplay 
communication. 
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A number of recent papers have suggested that possibilities of cheaptalk may undermine the 
ability of a planner to implement some allocation mles, because of the multiplicity of equilibri a 
that often arise in direct games with preplay communication. 42 This suggests a role for indirect
mechanisms, and an application of the techniques developed for the existence/characterization 
theorems of Section 4. Palfrey and Srivastava [ 1 99 1b] investigate the use of indirect mechanisms 
for "cheaptalk-proof' implementations of interim efficient allocation rules in economic 
environments . 
Given any mechanism (M , g ) ,  define a class of extensive form games, called the set of 
(finite) communication extensions of (M , g ) . 43 This.  consists of all games which begin with a
finite number of communication stages where players transmit messages to each other, followed 
by a final stage in which the mechanism (M , g )  is played out. Of course, there may be many 
new equilibrium outcomes in a communication extension of (M , g )  because information may be 
transmitted between the agents, as in the example above. 
Let X (M , g )  be the set of all Bayesian equilibrium allocation rules of the mechanism
(M , g ) . Let xc (M , g )  be the set of all Bayesian equilibrium allocation rules of all communication
extensions of (M , g ). We say that (M , g )  is cheap talk-proof if X (M , g )  = Xe (M , g ) . 
Unfortunately, it is hard to prove general theorems about cheaptalk-proof mechanism design, 
because it may be that X (M , g )  and xc (M , g )  only differ in ways that are inconsequential in
utility te1ms. 
For this reason, we introduce the concept of essential implementation, as a slightly weaker 
implementation requirement. 
Definition 9 :  Let x be a social choice function. Then (M , g )  essentially implements x if x is an 
equilibrium outcome of (M , g )  and all other equilibrium allocation rules of (M , g )  produce the 
same (interim) utility allocations to all types of all players. 
We can define essentially cheaptalk-proof in a similar way. Let U (M , g )  be the set of 
interim utility allocations associated with all allocation rules in X (M , g ) ,  and let uc (M ,  g )  be the
set of interim utility allocations associated wit11 all allocation rules in xc (M , g ) . 
Definition 10:  (M ,  g )  is essentially cheap talk-proof if U (M , g )  = U c  (M , g ) . 
We may then show that there is a close connection between interim efficiency of an 
allocation and tl1e possibility for it to be essentially implemented using an essentially cheaptalk­
proof mechanism. Specifically, we restrict attention to enviomments of the following sort: 
1 .  Sidepayments. 
2 .  Private values : U (x ( t ) ,  t )  = U (x ( t ) ,  ti ) for all i ,  t ,  x .  
3 .  Independent types: q ( t )  = q 1 (t 1 )  · · · qN (tN )  for all t .  
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Theorem 6: If x is interim efficient and incentive compatible, then it is essentially implementable 
using an essentially cheaptalk-proof mechanism. 
Proof (from Palfrey and Srivastava [199lb]): It is easiest to prove for the case of transferable 
utility, so that if we write x ( t )  = (a ( t ), w ( t )) then for all i ,  t; , and x we have U; (x ( t ), t; ) = 
Vi (a ( t ) ,  t; ) + w; ( t ). Given the allocation rnle x ,  for each a ,  i ,  and t; , let P; (a , t; ) be the
(interim) probability of outcome a conditional on player i being type t; and let W; (t; ) be the
expected transfer to player i . The mechanism is defined as follows. The message space for each 
agent is T; x [0, 1] . The outcome function is defined below:  
(I) If m; = (t; , 0) for all i then g ( m) = x ( t ) .
(II) If mj = (tj ,0) for all j i' i and m; = (t; E )  with E > 0, then a is  chosen randomly by the
planner according to the distribution P ( · , t; ) and i receives a transfer equal to Wi (ti )  - E .
All players j * i divide the cost of this transfer equally. 
(III) If more than one agent reports a positive number then the agent who reports the smallest 
positive number plays the role of i in (II). If there is a tie, then the agent with the lowest 
index plays that role. 
It is easy to see that if x is incentive compatible then it is a Bayesian equilibrium for everyone to 
honestly report their type and for no type of any agent to report a positive number. Second, since 
x is interim efficient if any other type-reporting strategies coupled with always sending 0 is not 
interim utility equivalent to x then it cannot be an equilibrium, since some type of some agent 
would be better off reporting some small enough positive number. Third, there can be no 
equilibrium with any type of any agent reporting a positive number, since it is always better to 
report a smaller positive number. II 
This result, and the proof, extends to common value environments where the dependence o f  
Ui o n  t_i i s  additively separable from the dependence of Vi on t; . This includes what Myerson
[ 1 98 1 ]  calls "revision effects . "  The extent to which cheaptalk-proof implementation can be 
achieved with more general preferences or in environments with dependent types is an interesting 
open quesiton. It is also not known whether it is possible to implement inefficient allocations . 
However, it would seem to be the case that allocation mles such as the one in the example could 
not be implemented in a cheaptalk-proof way even with sidepayments .44
The construction in Theorem 6 exploits the fact that in independent private values models, 
interim expected utilities depend only on the "reduced fmm" of an allocation rule , denoted above 
by P; ( · ) and Wj ( · ) , each of which depends only on player i 's type. This is also tme in common 
value models as long as the dependence of player i 's utility on the other players ' types enters 
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separably. 
If players ' utilities only depend on the reduced form, the planner simply gives players the 
opportunity of unilateraly "buying out" of the mechanism in exchange for a small payment. If 
player i buys out of the mechanism, the planner ignores the other players ' messages and simply 
imposes a (possibly random) allocation, depending only on i 's reported type, ti , that is equivalent
in i 's reduced form to the allocation, x ,  that the planner was trying to implement. In exchange, 
the "buyer" of this option must pay a small price. Clearly, if all players other than i are behaving 
tmthfully, then i will not want to buy out. However, as long as x is inte1im efficient, if players 
are not behaving tmthfully, generating an allocation Xa, then ·either Xa is interim equivalent to x ,  
or some type of some player will be better off "buying out" at some small enough price, E > 0. 
There are several applications of the above result, as a number of revelation principle 
applications involve models with independent private values, and/or revision efforts.45 One such
application would be the multiple equilibrium problem in the double auction of example 2 in 
Section 2. For example, with a uniform distribution of types, the allocation rule corresponding to 
the linear bidding equilib1ium of the split-the-difference double auction is interim efficient. 
Therefore, augmenting the double auction as in Theorem 6 will uniquely implement that 
allocation, despite the continuum of equilibrium in the direct game. 
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Endnotes 
1 .  The committment assumption is being relaxed in the recent line of work on renegotiation in 
contracting. See, for example, Dewatripont [ 1989] , Green and Laffont [ 1987b] , Baron and 
Besanko [ 1 987] , Maskin and Thule [ 1989] , and Hart and Tirole [ 1987] . Work on the durability 
of mechansims is also relevent here . See Crawford [ 1985] ,  Holmstrom and Myerson [ 1983] , 
Legros [ 1990] , and Cramton and Palfrey [ 1990b] . Macroeconomists have also studied a closely 
related committment problem for a planner ("time consistency"),  albeit from a somewhat differenl 
perspective. (See, for example, Kydland and Prescott [ 1977]). 
2. These are sometimes called "nuisance" messages. (Moore and Repullo [1988]) .
3 .  That the basic issues are the same does not imply that all the theorems are the same. Where it 
is relevent we will discuss the differences. 
4. This is trne, for example, in domains with strict preferences. See Dasgupta, Hammond and
Maskin [1979] . 
5 .  For example, in public goods environments, we typically need assumption of no income 
effects. This produces well-known positive reslts , summarized in Green and Laffont [ 1 979] and 
Groves [ 1982] . Under domain restrictions, we can get positive results with private goods as well, 
as in Vickrey [ 1961 ] .  More recently Mookherjee and Reichelstein [ 1989] have some further 
positive results. 
6. Most of the early work on Nash implementation was formulated in general equilibrium
settings. See for example Hurwicz [ 1979] , Groves and Ledyard [ 1977] ,  Schmeidler [ 1980] , and 
the references cited in the Postlewaite [ 1985] survey. The solution concept of maximin 
equilibrium has also been explored. (Thomson [ 1978]). 
7 .  This nearly sounds like a contradiction. However, the planner is uninformed, so each 
individual has some private information that the planner does not know. The complete 
information assumption used in Nash equilibrium implementation means that players have 
redundant information. For example, if the planner does not know the individuals ' preference, 
then by "complete information" we mean that the entire preference profile is common knowledge 
among the players. For alternative interpretations of Nash implementation, the reader is referred 
to Maskin's [ 1986] survey. 
8. For characterizations of incentive compatibility in Nash equilibrium, see Mookhe1jee and
Reichelstein [ 1990] . With more than two players , the incentive compatibility problem can be 
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entirely avoided. 
9. This point is clearly made in Repullo [ 1987] .
1 0. Information is called "non-exclusive" (Postlewaite and Schmeidler [ 1986]) if the pooled 
information of any collection of N-1  of the agents refines the infomation of the N1h agent. In
many applications, non-exclusive information and complete information strnctures produce 
essentially identical results (Palfrey and Srivastava [ 1 986] ,  Blume and Easley [ 1 990]) .  
1 1 .  The reason for this is  pretty obvious, since B ayesian equilibrium is  just a Nash equilibrium 
with a different inf01mation strncture - or, alternatively, complete info1mation Nash equilbrium is 
a special case of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. These connections are discussed at length in 
Harsanyi [ 1 967-8] . The distinction of the Bayesian implementation approach is most apparent 
when individuals have "exclusively private information" so that forcing contracts are not available 
to the planner. 
12 .  As an historical note , the Laffont and Maskin [ 1982] survey for the Fourth World Congress 
ten years ago focussed mainly on the incentive compatibility problem. They comment that 
"Bayesian incentive schemes are plagued by multiple equilibrium" (p. 77). 
1 3 .  This is not critical. Agents 2 and 3 could have correlated information, and the same problem 
arises (see Palfrey and Srivastava [ 1991c]) ,  but the analysis becomes messier. 
14 .  A similar problem arises in the multiple-agent environment studied by Demski and 
Sappington [ 1 984] . Ma, Moore and Turnbull [ 1 988] constmct on indirect mechanism to resolve 
the multiple equilibrium problem in that evnironment. They refer to it as the problem of "agents 
cheating." There may also be other mixed strategy equilbria, which would depend parametrically 
on the cardinal utilities. However, implementation theory usually considers implementation via 
pure strategies only. An exception is in a section of Matsushima [ 1 990bJ. 
15. These are pure stratgies. Mixed stratgies are, for the most part, ignored in implementation
theory. 
1 6. The possibility of inconsistencies arises when there is some degree of non-exclusivity of 
information. 
17 .  Extensive analysis of related normative concepts may be found in May [ 1 952J and Fishburn 
[ 1 973] . 
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1 8 . In this section, we state the necessary conditions for social choice correspondence. The 
definitions for social choice functions are obtained directly. 
19 .  This is Moore and Repullo ' s  l 1 988] terminology. 
20. Details of the construction with independent types are found in Palfrey and S rivastava
(199 1 c) .  
21 .  The constmction in  Palfrey and Srivastava [ 1989b] allowed free disposal, in  the sense that 0 
was a feasible allocation. The free disposal assumption is not needed if information is diffuse. 
22. Postlewaite and Schmeidler [ 1 986, 1987] and Palfrey and Srivastava ( 1 987, 1989bJ use a
different representation of information, in which player types are not explicitly mentioned. 
Instead, for each state s E S , individual i observes an event, E i ( s ), which is the set of all states
that he cannot distinguish from S .  While these representations are essentially identical (see 
Mookherjee and Reichelstein ( 1 990, p. 474] and Jackson ( 1 991 ] ) ,  the " type" representation is less 
cumbersome, especially when assuming a common prior q ( t) and diffuse information (q ( t) > 0
for all t E T) .  We will stick with the type representation here.
23. They also provide a characterization of the set of Bayesian implementable allocations in
exchange economies when information may be non-exclusive, and Jackson [ 1 99 1 ]  provides more 
general results for that case. See below. Finally, notice that Theorem 4 does nol require N = 3,  
in contrast to most other results. 
24. Ties can be resolved in any number of ways. For example, they can be broken in favor of
the agent with the lowest index. 
25 . The terminology "public information" and "publicly predictable information" was used in 
Palfrey and Srivastava [ 1986] and Blume and Easley [ 1983 ] ,  respectively. Those concepts are 
equivalent to NEI. 
26. This statement requires the caveat that there exists a universally bad outcome. The early
results were .. for pure exchange-economies, where the 0 outcome served . that purpose. 
27. In fact, it is equivalent to complete information when there are only two agents .
28. The term splicing comes from Jackson [ 1991 ] .
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29. Closure is not an issue with diffuse information, and does not play a role in the
implementation of social choice functions. 
30. A deception a is incompatible if q (a( t )) = 0 for some t .
3 1 .  Generally, rational expectations equilibria are not incentive compatible. See, for example, 
Blume and Easley [ 1990] . NEI environments are quite special in this respect. 
32. With complete information, this assumption is very weak. With incomplete information, this
assumption rules out a large class of interesting environments when a player 's  type indexes what 
he knows about the other players ' types. 
33. There has been no analogous work in Bayesian implementation.
34. One could define E ( · ) arbitrarily. If E is efficient as s then we w ill have E (g ( m ) , s )  =
g ( m )  at s .
35. The outcomes detennined by this bargaining technology may themselves not be attainable as
Nash equilibrium to some mechanism. 
36. See Crawford [ 1985] , Holmstrom and Myerson [ 1983 ] ,  Cramton and Palfrey [ 1990b], Legros
[ 1 990] and the references therein. 
37. See Myerson [ 1 983]  and Maskin and Tirole [ 1989, 1 990].
38. Perhaps durably implementable would be a better term.
39. This follows from the same logic as the proof of Theorem 2 in Legros [ 1 990] or the proof of
Theorem 3 in Palfrey and Srivastava [ 1991b] .  A general formulation of interim renegotiation­
proofuess i s  in Palfrey and Srivastava [ 1991c] .  
40. See footnote 2. These problems can also arise with symmetrically informed agents if some
state contingent contracts are not possible. 
4 1 .  Abreu and Sen [ 1989a] , Herrero and Srivastava [ 1 989] ,  and Moore and Repullo [ 1 988] .  
42.  See for example, Matthews and Postlewaite [ 1 989] , Chakravorti [ 1 989] , and Zou [ 1 990] . 
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43. Farrell [ 1983] calls this a communication version of (M , g ) .
44. But, it m ay be possible with the addition of an uninfmmed player.
45 . This would include, among others, Myerson [ 198 1 ] ,  Harris and Raviv [ 1 9 8 1 ] ,  Cramton and 
Palfrey [ 1990a] Ledyard and Palfrey [ 1990] , Mailath and Postlewaite [ 1 990] , Myerson and 
Satterthwaite [ 1983] , and others. 
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